J particinants. uresent some of the most interesting and difficult antitrust issues. Modern payment and electronic funds transfer networks are technologies that have greatly benefited consumers and the economy by reducing transaction costs and allowing consumers to economize on their holdings of non-interest hearing forms of money Payment networks, however, may also be able to engage in collective actions that allow their members to exercise market power, and these networks have been involved in several significant antitrust disputes. If members of a payment network exercise market po\ver, the effects can he eouivalenr. to a privately imposed sales tax on all network transactions.' Retail sales of aoods and services in the United States total about 32 trillion per year. A significant fraction of these sales are made by merchants who accent credit cards and other electronic forms of paymuent, so even a small tax on transactions becatmse of market power can affect a large volume of sales. And because networks often exhibit significant scale econounies, rival systems may not exist or may be unable to constrain the dominant svstem~s pricing significantly Economies of scale can make it hard for a relatively small network to coanpete and grow if the dominant network is significantly larger.
It can he difficult to determine whether a particular collective rule, or a particular husiness combination between two competing networks, creates net benefits or net harms to consumers. Though antitrust intervention with respect to a network~structure or policies has the potential to generate savings for society, it also carries potential risks. Ill-founded antitrust intervention can reduce or eliminate the benefits society could otherwise enjoy from efficient network muergers and practices and can deter other networks from embarking on efficient activities. Antitrust intervention should therefore take place only when the economic effects of intervention are well understood and there is clear evidence that the benefits from intervention outweigh the harms.
It is sometimes stated that there are two levels at which competition occurs in payment networks: intrasystern competition occurs among members of a given network. and inrcrsvstem competition occurs among competing networks. Though this dichotomy is useful for some purposes, it has also led to confusion about the competitive importance of particular network rules and structures. Courts and commentators sometimes have treated the number of independent (and nonoverlapping) networks as the sole determinant of socierys welfare. thouch we believe that the competitive economics of navment networks are far more complicated.
In this article we examine the concent of network comupetition and the notion that consumers of payment services can always be best nrorecrecl through vigorous efforts by courts and antitrtmst enforcers to prevent the formation of overincltcsive networks. It is our view that one typically cannot determine, on the basis of theoretical considerations alone, whether permitting access to payment networks by firms that already provide payment services is, on net, beneficial or harmful to consumers or to society. Instead, we believe that a careful analysis of the facts and economic evidence concerning particular networks and their policies is necessary to justify antitrust interyention.
We explain later that in same cases such a network might even be able to impase this tax an transactions that do not use the network.
Far example, Visa made it difficult fnr same merchants to accept the Discover Card by refusing ta allow them to process Discover Card tronsac tians an the same merchant terminals as Visa transactions.
In section 2 we describe our analysis of Visa's exclusion of Dean Witter, owner of the Discover Card.
2 The Dean Witter case illustrates many of the issues that arise in antitrust controversies involving payment systems. First, we show that despite assertions by Visa, an appellate court, and some antitrust commentators, intrasystem competition can be significantly affected by a rule that denies membership to a large-scale, price-cutting firm like Dean Witter. even when there are already thousands of members in the network. This analysis refutes the notion that societyw elfare depends entirely on the number of independent networks in the market. Second, we examine Visa's purported justifications for its exclusionary policy and show that the evidence does not support their justifications. Third, we explain why maximizing the number of competing networks does not necessarily lead to the greatest possible consumer benefits. 'We explain how network rules (and merchants' transaction costs) affect the prices consumers pay for credit card services and for the goods and services they purchase from merchants that accept credit cards. We show that Dean Witter's membership in Visa was unlikely to have any significant harmful effects on intersystem competition and its exclusion by Visa is instead likely to retard the introduction of new competing networks. We conclude that in this case Dean Witter meets our high standard for antitrust intervention.
In section 3 we explain why the arguments raised by other symposium participants regarding the alleged harmful effects of ATM network mergers fall far short of our standard for supporting antitrust intervention. Though these participants condemn virtually all network mergers because they eliminate competition between competing networks, we show that mandating their version of intersystem competition through antitrust enforcement is not a competitive panacea and in fact is likely to harm society We analyze the effects of an ATM network merger in Chicago to illustrate our point. Finally section 4 presents a brief conclusion. 
NETWORK COMPEUTN 4 ON

A, Single New Visa Card issuer Like
Dean Wiite-r Can Benefit Cansun'rers Visa's first argument was that, because it already had thousands of issuers and did not set the terms of the card plans offered by those members, it could not keep prices higher and exercise market power by excluding any one potential member. As a logical matter, this argument is wrong. Exclusion of an unusually efficient firm can indeed adversely affect competition. Moreover, this argument was directly contradicted by evidence that Visa and its members expected that entry by a large-scale, low-price firns like Dean Witter would have depressed prices and profits significantly Visa members had good reason to think so. In March 1990, one year before Dean Witter had planned to launch its Visa card, AT&T rocked the banking industry by launching a massive bank credit card program. Whereas the top credit card issuers generally charged a 520 annual fee on their accounts, AT&T offered consumers a credit cardJreejor lrfe if they accepted during the program's first year and used the card at least once a year.
'The U.S. Supreme Caurt declined to review the Tenth Circuit's decision.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS
Average Annual Fee Charged by Visa Issuers
Annual Fee (Current Dollars)
high interest rates and usury laws caused credmt card mssuers to mncur stgnmltcant losses, is now much less common.
In an earlier article we cited this AT&T effect as evidence that a large price-cutting AT&T GM entrant could generate significant benefits to consumers. 6 Figure 1 shows the trend 
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p for renewal after obtaining AT&T's card or hearing of its offer. As banks reacted with no-fee or low-fee card programs of their own, additional banks decided to drop their annual fees and some banks that initially dropped fees only for the first year decided later to make the no-fee feature permanent.
We estimate the following annual fee regression equations: See Curltan and Fronkel (1995a, 1 995b) for discussions of trade press accounts of AT&T's entry into and effect an the morket.
Average Annual Fee Charged by Visa Issuers
6 Cnrltan and Frankel (1995o) .
'The data are those used by Evans and Schmalensee (1985) . Industry observers say the effect of AT&T on the credit card market was profound.
5 Hundreds of other banks began reducing or waiving their annual fees, and many industry participants and analysts credited AT&T with igniting a price war. Visa adopted rule changes to make more difficult a repeat of AT&T's program, and several banks tried to persuade various regulators that AT&T's program should be shut down because of alleged legal violations. Dean Witter tried to follow AT&T one year later, and General Motors did launch a major no-fee card of its own in late 1992. Others have since followed, and the annual fee, which became prevalent in the early I980s when credit controls,
(1) Log(RFee) = +~,(T>Kr&T Entry)
where REee is the average annual fee in constant 1992 dollars, T is a measure of time, and (T>AT&T Entry) and (T>GM Entry) are zero before the respec-
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF ST. LOVES FEDERAL RESERVR BANK OF ST. LOUIS
a i s set equal to zero in 1990:1, and rises by increments of 0.25 per quarter. In the linear specificatians there is no staisflcally significant change in the level of fees at the flme of entry. In lquaton 1, (with an AT&'f but no GM effect), there appears to be slight upward shift in fees for the first three quarters, after which the net effect i s negative and stuhsticolly significant. Because it may take time far consumers ta switch issuers, we da not empect on immediate ance'and'fonall downward shift in fees and instead impose the constraint that the overage fee i s confinuous with respect to time. This constraint has only a minor effect on the other caeffic leats. Regression specifications carr ecting for serial correlation generally confirm the findings reported in table 1. Evans and Schmalensee claim that annual fees were declining in inflation' adjusted terms even before AT&T entered, and a regression analysis shows no incremental effect of AT&T's entry on the level of fees. Their analysis, however, suffers from at least two serious defects. First, Evans ond Schmalensee test for a once-andtor-all, immediate shift downward in fees ot the time of AT&T's entry, after which they impose the con straint that fees continue to decline at the old rate. As our analysis shows, it i s important to allow for a change in the rate of decline of annual fees to identify on effect. Second, they omit half ofthe post'AT&T data from their analysis.
''The quarterly Federal Reserve data ore published in the monthly Federal Reserve bulletins and in electronic form and are reprinted in the oppendim to this article.
'Regressions correcting for serial correlation ond regressions allowing far effects operating with a log generally confirm these findings. tive entry dates of those firms and equal using various consumer interest rate to the amount of time (in years) that has series published by the Federal Resen'e." elapsed since their entry rhereafter.~The
The coefficients on the interaction between regression equations implicitly restrict the AT&T dummy and the other interest average annual fees to be continuous at rate series (that is, AT&T X other interest the date of AT&T and GM's entry' Quarrate) is generally positive and statistically terly dummy variables account for significant, indicating that credit card seasonal effects.
rates became more responsive to movements Table I summarizes the AT&T and in other marker interest rates after AT&T's GM effects we estimate for these specificaentry The results also indicate that tions. The results are quite clear. The the overall level of credit card interest decline in average Visa annual fees accelerrates (that is, the coefficient on the AT&T ated significantly after AT&T entered. dummy plus the coefficient on the AT&T Figures 1 and 2 and i'able 1 also show >< other interest rate interaction variable another important phecmomnenon. When multiplied by the actual other interest GM, a second aggressive no-fee entrant, rate) fell slightly in the period following introduced its programu 2'!, years after AT&T, AT&T's entry though this effect is not the decline in annual fees accelerated furstatistically significant." ther. This result supports our contention Within three years of AT&T's industry that Dean \Vitter, which would have entered shake-up. average annual fees had fallen 1 '/2 years before GM. would have generated by 27 percent, and after 4½ years, annual significant benefits to consumers." fees had fallen by 53 percent. Credit card We also conduct a preliminary analysis interest rates became more responsive to of credit card interest rates (which some changes in other interest rates. We believe commentators have suggested are unusually that AT&T and other entrants like GM unresponsive to movemnents in other market had such significant effects, despite the interest rates) and find evidence that credit existence of mammy other issuers, because card interest rates were also affected by they used novel marketing programs that AT&T's entry Visa has thousands of card-issuing members, most of which also issue MasterCard cards. Visa's largest member, Citibank, not only issues MasterCard cards, it also issues two proprietary card brands, Diners Club and Carte Blanche. Dean Witter itseLf had an affiliate that was a Visa member at the time it introduced the Discover Card. There is simply no evidence that these members have ever misappropriated valuable Visa information, and there is no basis to believe that misappropriation would be a problem for Dean Witter. There are few important secrets that are disseminated to 6,000 members and remain secret, and those that are, such as information conveyed in the approval of individual transactions, are protected by contract. So inconsequential is this concern of misappropriation that Citibank not only is allowed to serve on Visa's board of directors, hut also was for several years guaranteed representation-despite its ownership of competing card brands. There is no reason to believe, nor did Visa argue, that misappropriation should he a greater concern for Dean Witter than anyone else.
Visa also alleged that Dean Witter's entry would allow it to free-ride on the investments made by its founding members, an investment on which Visa members were entitled to receive a return and should not be forced to share. According to Visa, such forced sharing of property would have eroded the incentive for Visa to form and develop. However, most of Visa's thousands of memnbers, including six of its largest 10 issuers, joined the network many years after Visa was formed. Even today Visa maintains an open membership policy as long as the applicant does not issue any brands deemed competitive by the Visa board. This openness presumably demonstrates the lack of any inefficiencies from allowing new members and likely reflects the efficiencies Visa realizes from expanding the size of the network. Indeed, Visa's justification for excluding Dean Witter to protect investment returns of earlier members has nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that Dean Winter happens to issue a cornpeting card brand. Every new Visa member shares Visa's property in exactly the same way that Dean Witter would have if it had been allowed to issue Visa cards. If taken seriously Visa's argument would allow it to expel any firm selectively on the basis that it was not a founder and competed too vigorously with lower prices or better service. Though it is important to protect property rights, the antitrust laws do not grant joint ventures the unlimited property right to profits achieved through a collective exercise of market power.m 4 Visa's past behavior in granting applications for membership reveals that its exclusion of Dean Witter cannot be justified on an argument that its entry will erode the property rights that were necessary to create the incentives to form and develop Visa.
Vlsa~rRule Threatens lniersystern Cornpetition, But Dears WitleVi-
Mew~-~w'o;-'~'saDae~Na'
One check on the exercise of collective market power by members of a joint venture is freedom of its individual members to offer proprietary products and services outside the operation of the joint venture in competition with the joint venture's product. Paymnent systems are no exception. Though proprietary payment systems may he unable to realize the scale economies of the large joint ventures, they tnay at least Interchange fees in the credit card networks are paid by the bank servicing the merchant to the bank servicing the cardholder in transactions involving two different banks. These fees are set by the collective action of Visa banks. Discover Card has no interchange fees because its transactions always involve a single financial institution. But Discover Card, like Visa members, negotiates discount rates with merchants. The merchant receives not the total face amount of a credit card transaction, but only the net amount after deduction of the merchant discount. Visa merchant banks must pay the interchange fee out of the proceeds from the merchant discount. Therefore Visa members have an incentive to reduce their merchant discount rates as Visa reduces the interchange fee.
Visa's supporters argued that if Dean Witter became a Visa member, it would increase its merchant discount rate on Discover Card transactions to enable Visa to raise its interchange fee, (and consequently to allow Visa members to raise their discount rates). However, there is a flaw in this analysis. It assumes that Dean Witter's introduction of the Discover Card has caused Visa to keep interchange fees significantly lower than it would have otherwise. There is no evidence to support this assumption. It is true that Discover Card was introduced with lower merchant discount rates than were typically charged by Visa members. That was because Discover Cards were carried and used by relatively few consumers and merchants were unwilling to pay much for a Discover Card transaction, since they would lose few transactions if they declined to accept it. But Discover Card's lower discount rate would cause Visa to reduce its interchange
fee only if significant numbers of merchants began to decline acceptance of Visa cards and Visa members could not reduce their merchant discount rates in response because the interchange fee was too high. This has not happened and is unlikely to happen. There are simply too many consumers using Visa cards for most merchants to be willing to accept only Discover Card (or, as explained later, induce consumers to use a Discover Card instead of a Visa card). This greatly attenuates the effect of intersysnem competition on merchant fees. There is another reason why Visa has not had to reduce its interchange fees in response to Discover Card. Most merchants do not distinguish their cash prices from their credit prices, and virtually no merchants charge different prices for different credit cards. There are several reasons to explain this behavior. First, many states ban surcharges on credit card transactions. Therefore while a discount for cash can be offered, this ban necessarily constrains all credit card transactions to occur at the same price. Second, credit card systems generally have contractual restrictions on merchants that prohibit merchants from doing anything-particularly with respect to price-at the point of sale to discourage the use of their brands in favor of others. Third, even where merchants are free to charge different prices for cash and credit, they usually do not. This implies that transaction costs permit at least some differences in transaction costs between different payment methods to persist and not be passed on to consumers at the point of sale. As a result, even when permitted, merchants generally do not offer inducements to consumers to use a particular brand of credit card even if its merchant discount rate is lower. Therefore once a credit card brand is accepted by a merchant, that brand gains no incremental sales by reducing its merchant discount rate. For all these reasons, Discover Card's merchant discount rate has little effect on the comparable rate for Visa.
In our earlier article we explained that we have neither performed nor seen relevant studies that determine whether interchange fees are, on net, a procompetitive or anticompetitive practice compared with an at-par settlement system like that used for checks. Because merchants usually do not charge different prices for cash and credit, one effect of interchange fees is to raise the price to cash customers. (The merchant must raise the single price charged to recover the merchant discount, much of which reflects the interchange fee.) If credit card interchange fees are on balance harmful to consumers, then keeping Dean Witter out of Visa does little or nothing to solve that problem for the reasons explained previously Moreover, if interchange fees somehow generate antitrust harm and excess profits, then antitrust policy should encourage card issuers' efforts, like those of Dean Witter, to rebate those profits to consumers, whether explicitly with cash or in-kind rebates, or implicitly with low prices for credit card services. In any event, antitrust policy should probably encourage the relaxation of restrictions on merchants' abilities to influence the choice of payment method at the point of sale.
In its argument, Visa stressed that Dean Witter doesn't need Visa to compete in the relevant market, so Visa should not have to admit Dean Witter. According to Visa, as long as a firm like Dean Witter can survive in the market on its own, it should have no recourse under the antitrust laws to demand entry into the dominant network. However, consumers can still be harmed even if a firm excluded from a dominant network can still survive. If Visa's reasoning were accepted, a dominant ATM network, for example, could expel banks that charged low fees, even if the only motive for and effect of the expulsion was an increase in market prices and profits of the remaining banks. Such expulsions would he immune from antitrust challenge under Visa's standard because the expelled banks could still compete by offering their own customers access to proprietary ATM terminals. and Fmnkel (1995o, l995b) . Duality means that a firm par' ticipoting in one network i s permined to participate also in another competing network.
of network members on the one hand with the number of networks on the other. The issues are far too complicated to settle on such simple grounds. We have shown through a careful analysis of the competitive effects resulting from Visa's exclusion of Dean Witter that mandating access to an intersystem competitor can sometimes be a sensible antitrust policy We were able to reach this conclusion because Visa's efficiency justifications are meritless. In such a situation, Visa's exclusion of Dean Witter is a naked exclusion, one whose sole effect is to harm consumers.' 6
We are generally reluctant to recommend intervention in the operation or rules of a joint venture because we are concerned with the inefficiencies caused by interfering in an efficiently operating joint venture. When a rule like the Visa rule that excludes Dean Witter causes anticompetitive harm to consumers and has no offsetting efficiency benefit, however, such intervention is appropriate. If, on the other hand, there were significant legitimate efficiency considerations of roughly the same magnitude as the procompetitive benefit frotn Dean Witter's entry into Visa, we likely would have been unable to support Dean Witter's position."
INTERSYSTEM COMPETN UON, fN ATM NETWORKS
Our standard for supporting antitrust intervention in joint ventures is that the gain to society from intervention clearly exceeds the harm, taking into account all legitimate efficiencies-with the benefit of the doubt going to the joint venture in close cases. This standard generally can be met only by a careful analysis of the facts and evidence of a particular case.
Our standard stands in sharp contrast to
that offered by other participants in this symposium. David Balto and Donald Baker lament the decline of intersystem competition in payment systems and condemn virtually all network mergers and network duality 1 ' The focus of their discussion is ATM network consolidation, which they blame on antitrust enforcement that has, they say for many years been far too lax. They claim that regulators followed a policy of favoring network mergers to achieve efficiencies of ubiquity and imply that that policy was misguided because those efficiencies pale in comparison with those that could have resulted from maintaining internetwork competition. Balto and Baker would recommend unwinding many ATM network mergers because they think consumers have been greatly harmed. If that is the case, there should be by now (after many such mergers have occurred) plenty of evidence of that harm. However, they present little such evidence. They cite a few examples of ATM network mergers in which they claim that incentive discount membership programs were eliminated following a merger, but they present no evidence of aggregate consumer benefit or harm, or even of systematic increases in fees to consumers following mergers. Moreover, even if consumer prices did go up following mergers (and we are unaware of systematic evidence to that effect), consumers might still be better off as a result of the increased network size and geographic density As the number of participants and terminals on the network increases, consumers can rely more on the network. The full cost of using ATM services, including search costs and the risk of being unable to find an operating terminal, might have fallen even if some fees increased. More relevant than price is quantity If quantity rises as a result of a merger, that is evidence suggesting that consumers have benefited.
To illustrate how one might approach a systematic analysis of the competitive effects of ATM network mergers, we examine the results of a network merger between the only two regional shared ATM networks in Chicago, Cash Station and Money Network. Before 1987 these two networks competed with each other, hut in late 1986 they agreed to merge. Following a transition that lasted more than a year, all consumers could use all ATM terminals belonging to members of the now-combined network in early 1988. I-low were consumers affected by this merger? Balto and Baker would probably have condemned it outright and would have favored antitrust intervention to prevent it. After all, they would reason, the market supported two networks before, so two networks can clearly survive in this market. Why lose the benefits of competition between the networks? However, this simple argument is insufficient to justify antitrust intervention. As Table 3 shows, output by any measure soared following rhe merger. In 1987, when the networks had already begun to merge, there were 850 ATM ternninals in the network, and the combined networks processed 34.7 nuillion interbank transactions at an average network operating cost of 50.225 per transaction. By 1990 the number of terminals had increased by 146 percent (compared with an increase of 18 percenn for the United States as a whole), the number of transactions had increased by 108 percent (compared with 45 percent for the United States), and the network's average cost per transaction had fallen by 66 percent. This huge growth in network participation and tnsage occurred despite the imposition by many banks, for the first time, of foreign fees on their customers when they use ATM terminals owned by other banks. In 1991 the merged network increased its interchange fee, the fee paid by a card-issuing hank to the hank that owns the terminal used by its customers. The interchange fee influences the issuers' decision to Ievyjoreign fees, but can also affect the incentive banks have to deploy terminals. In fact, the number of terminals in the network has grown faster than in the United States as a whole, and transaction volume exceeds the level that existed before the increase of the interchange fee. These results suggest that the Cash Station/N oney Network merger was procompetitive and benefited consumers. It demonstrates the risks associated with basing antitrust enforcement on a simple tally of the number of independent networks and suggests that preventing network mergers and instead relying on internetwork competition to generate consumer benefits in payment networks may entail too great a cost in foregone efficiencies from network consolidation.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of antitrust legislation is to maximize the benefits society obtains from competition. Payment system networks that are formed as joint ventures by competing financial institutions, like other types of joint ventures, present difficult antitrust issues because competing firms must cooperate to provide service. Some commentators have argued that the way to resolve these difficult issues is to use antitrust intervention to ensure that multiple payment networks remain separate and compete with one another. We have shown that this simple policy recommendation is inadequate. Instead, a thorough analysis of the competitive effects of an)' proposed antitrust intervention in these networks must be done before such intervention can he justified on the grounds of increasing society's welfare.
We showed how; in the Dean Witter/Visa case, one can perform such an analysis and support intervention when, as in that case, the evidence shows that the consumer benefit from intervention clearly exceeds the harm. We also showed, using an ATM-network nuerger as an example, that antitrust intervention based only on the number of networks can be misguided. The pursuit of competing and completely nonoverlapping networks should not be the driving force of antitrust policy toward payment networks. In many cases society is likely to benefit from mergers of competing payment networks and is also likely to benefit from antitrust action that attacks restrictions imposed by a dominant network on the freedom of its members to compete as they wish. Payment systems continue to evolve, and new technologies are on the horizon. Antitrust can affect the extent to which society will benefit from these technologies. Antitrust enforcement that has a consistently positive effect on society's welfare will require serious and careful economic analysis. 
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